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The Most Special Need of All: The Right to Be Left Alone
Analysis of Chicago Public Schools Metal Detector Policy
Michael W. Simpson
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Abstract
Metal detectors have become common educational equipment. This paper analyzes the development, evolution, and 
legal basis for the Chicago Public Schools metal detector policy. The paper agrees that schools are indeed special 
places with special needs, but reaches a different conclusion on school search law than the current Supreme Court. 
     “The right to be left alone is indeed the beginning of all freedoms.” 
                             -Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas (Quotes about Liberty)
                                                                                                                                       
The Policy
     Four years after the United States Supreme Court made clear that the special nature of public school officials 
did not relieve them from the constitutional responsibility of the Fourth Amendment as carried to state officials by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and that public school students have rights to be protected from encroachment by public 
school officials, the Chicago Public Schools (hereafter CPS) enacted their first policy on search and seizure (New 
Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) (hereafter T.L.O.) ; Board Report #89-0222-P02). This policy provided that metal detectors 
could be used in schools where the principal and the local school council determined such was needed to “provide a 
safe and proper educational environment.” School security officers were sworn police officers. Only they could 
operate metal detectors. The Bureau of Safety and Security had to be notified of detector use. If they determined the 
school safe and orderly, the use of metal detectors ceased. This policy added no costs to the CPS since they used 
metal detectors from the police department.   
      Changes were made to the policy in 1992. The requirement that only school security officers, who also were 
sworn police officers, could operate metal detectors was eliminated. The school security plan created by the principal 
and the local school council did not have to include the use of metal detectors. The general superintendent could use 
metal detectors as needed at any school to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of students (Board Report 
#92-0923-P01). There apparently had not been a major investment in detectors by the CPS as they continued to 
borrow from law enforcement.     
     The 1996 policy clarifies that by that time most of the CPS high schools and several other schools had walk-
through metal detectors and still others had their own hand-held metal detectors (Board Report #96-0522-P01). 
Garrett Electronics is one of the largest manufacturers of metal detectors. Sales increased 200% in 1994 and future 
sales were expected to skyrocket (Portner as cited in Bjorklum, 1996, p.2). 
     The 1996 policy represented a major change and put into place the structure of the current policy. This 
structure revolves around three types of metal detector screenings: random, as-needed, and daily (Board Report 
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#96-0522-P01, sect. III). Randomness referred to days chosen and not the selection of students (sect. III (1)). As-
needed screenings responded to particular safety concerns or special events (sect. III (2)). Daily screenings were 
conducted when the principal determined the educational environment required screenings and the local school 
council agreed by majority vote (sect. III (3)). School personnel could operate the detectors with available School 
Patrol units, including roving units and the Chicago Police Department officers. Detailed guidelines provided for a 
sign to be posted outside that “Any person entering this building may be subject to search.” Schools with student 
handbooks were to include metal detector information. Details were provided about creating sex-differentiated lines, 
handling of belongings, emptying pockets, provision of tables, and the progression of ever more intrusive search as 
the detector activated. 
     The 1999 changes made clear the authority of the school board’s CEO and the general superintendent’s 
authority to require metal detector searches in any of the three categories without the need of local school council 
approval (Board Report #99-0526-P02).
                                                                                                                                                  
   The current policy was adopted February 27, 2002, with board report number 02-0227-P01 approving section 
409.3 of the Chicago Public Schools Policy Manual. The stated purpose is to foster a proper educational 
environment and to promote safety and welfare of students. Weapons and drugs on school grounds and in the 
surrounding areas threaten this purpose (Introduction). The metal detector search expanded to explicitly include 
student bookbags, purses, and other personal belongings (sections III., IV. ). Additional language has been added to 
the random screenings provision that defines random screenings those searches not conducted on a regular basis and 
not brought about by particular safety concerns or special events. The policy states that such searches are effective 
and necessary in detecting and deterring the possession of weapons and the violence weapons bring. Language 
making the local school council approval necessary for random screenings was eliminated (sect. III A.). New section 
V provides for searches of less than the entire student body. The principal can choose not to conduct a metal detector 
search, search all students, or utilize the Office of Technology Services randomly assigned number. This number 
determines which students in line are selected for metal detector search. The principal must enter their decision on the 
three choices into the school computer system. 
     The current process for schools with permanent metal detectors is that signs are posted outside that indicate 
any person entering is subject to search. The process in the policy only directs the search of students. Students are to 
enter one of two lines determined by sex. Male staff are assigned to the male line; female staff to the female line. 
Students are directed to empty pockets and to place other belongings on table for scanning. These belongings are 
physically examined only if the hand-held detector is activated. Students                                                                        
are patted down if their walk-through activates the alarm. They are retested with a hand-held wand. They are then 
escorted to a more private place if the alarm sounds again.  A more thorough search of the person is conducted. No 
body cavity search is allowed. If any questions arise, officials are to contact the law department. If a weapon is 
found, the Chicago Police Department must be called (Chicago Public School Manual, section 409.3  IV). 
The Policy: Legal Authority
               “Of all tyrannies, a tyranny exercised for the good of its victims
                may be the most oppressive…. those who torment us for our own
                good will torment us without end, for they do so with the approval
                of their consciences.” – C.S. Lewis (Quotes about Liberty)
     
     The original 1989 policy cited three cases in support of the policy: New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985); Doe. v. 
Renfrow (1979); and People v. T.A. (sic J.A.)(1980). Only the T.L.O. case remains from this original list in support 
of the policy.  The Doe case arose out of Indiana when a school brought in drug-sniffing dogs with uniformed police 
officer handlers. The court stated that the standard of reasonableness in the public school setting is not probable 
2
Essays in Education, Vol. 15 [2005], Art. 14
https://openriver.winona.edu/eie/vol15/iss1/14
cause but a “reasonable cause to believe” that a school rule or law is violated if such is done to provide a safe, 
ordered, and healthy educational environment (p.1021). The court noted the independent evidence indicating actual 
evidence of drug abuse within the school. School officials did not rely on a generalized fear of drugs and violence 
within general society (p. 1021).  The presence of the police officer did not make the search a criminal search because 
the school requested the officer with an agreement that no arrests would occur (p.1019). 
                                                                                                                                                
   The Illinois trial court in People v. J.A. (1980) suppressed evidence when a school dean of students who was 
also a juvenile officer for the police department searched and seized drugs from a students coat. The trial court 
determined the dean of students lacked probable cause. The appellate court reversed finding that students have 
constitutional rights except where such are precluded by laws which enhance protection of the minor (p. 960). The 
standard for determining the reasonableness of public school official searches is reasonable suspicion and not 
probable cause. Public school officials are not law enforcement officers and are charged with the health and welfare 
of the students. A lesser standard for a search is appropriate (p. 962).
     The important concerns in these early cases were the involvement of law enforcement, the purpose of the 
school search, the independent evidence of both a problem in that particular school or with the particular individual, 
and whether probable cause or some lesser standard applied to searches by public school officials.  
 
     In New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court established that the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments apply to public school officials. While students have a legitimate expectation of privacy, such is 
accommodated to the need for school order. Reasonableness is determined by examining the totality of the 
circumstances. The twofold inquiry of T.L.O. has influenced school search cases significantly. This test requires that 
the search be justified in its inception and that the actually search be reasonably related in scope to the original 
justifying circumstances. Inception is justified by reasonable suspicion that search will turn up evidence of violation 
of either law or school rules. Permissible scope involves a measure reasonably related to the objectives and is not 
excessively intrusive considering the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. Thus, the search of a 
purse by a school principal was upheld. The U.S. Supreme Court left the question of individualized suspicion 
unanswered (footnote 8 at 342). 
     The Renfrow (1979) and J.A. (1980) cases discussed above are no longer used as legal references in the 
policy. In their stead are two automobile checkpoint cases: Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz (1990)(hereafter 
Sitz) and People v. Bartley (1985). In addition, People v. Pruitt (1996)(hereafter Pruitt) is cited and dealt directly with 
the public school metal detector issue. New Jersey v. T.L.O. continues to be cited as a case of major constitutional 
import for school searches. 
          The United States Supreme Court upheld Michigan’s automobile sobriety checkpoint program against Fourth 
Amendment challenge (Sitz, 1990). The Court chose the balancing test of the illegal immigrant checkpoint case over 
the special needs beyond law enforcement balancing test of the U.S. Customs drug testing program for employees in 
sensitive positions (Sitz, p. 450). The challengers to the checkpoint argued that the state needed more that a normal 
law enforcement purpose to stop people without individualized suspicion or probable cause.  The Court noted only 
that the question before them was a challenge to the checkpoints generally and that detention of individuals in a more 
extensive way may require individualized suspicion (Sitz, p. 451). The checkpoint balancing test examines the nature 
of the state interest, the subjective and objective intrusion, and the degree that the seizure advances the public interest. 
The Court determined that the state interest in stopping drunk driving was great (Sitz, p. 451). The objective intrusion 
is measured by the duration and intensity of the investigation. The subjective intrusion is                                              
measured by what the law abiding citizen would sense in fear and surprise (Sitz, p.452). The Court looked for some 
evidence that the stops lead to arrests to determine if the stops advanced the public interest. The majority determined 
the intrusions minimal and found that two or three arrests out of 124 stops advanced the public interest (Sitz, p.455). 
The state courts had found that the programs were ineffective and that the subjective intrusion was great. The 
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program was invalidated. Justices Brennan and Marshall questioned the lack of individual suspicion requirement in 
the majority opinion (Sitz, p.457). They state that, “Some level of individualized suspicion is a core component of the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment against arbitrary government action (Sitz, p. 457).” They note that this case was 
different than the U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) illegal immigrant checkpoint case because in that case, the flow of 
traffic made it impossible to allow a particularized study. In Sitz, police can observe impaired driving. The Martinez-
Fuerte case had been the only case where the Court upheld suspicionless seizure upon the general public prior to Sitz 
(p. 458).   Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall discussed the difference in intrusion between permanent, fixed 
checkpoints with notice and random, unannounced investigatory seizures (Sitz, pp. 462, 463). They were concerned 
with broad discretion in determining when and where the roadblock could be conducted (Sitz, p. 464).  These 
dissenters also remind us of important principles of most import in our fear-driven times when they cite the Justice 
Brandeis dissent in Olmstead v United States (1928) which was also cited by Justice Brennan in his opinion in 
T.L.O. that:
               “Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials
                --perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens—may be tempted
                to conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage 
                the perceived evil. But the Fourth Amendment rests on the principle                                                               
                that a true balance between the individual and society depends on the
                recognition of ‘the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of
                rights and the right most valued by civilized men.’(Sitz, p. 458)”
     People v. Bartley (1985) approved an Illinois sobriety checkpoint system that had extensive guidelines, was 
planned in advance, and was publicized beforehand.  No probable cause or individualized suspicion is required 
where a roadblock stopped everyone, had set procedures and guidelines which bridled field discretion, were not 
roving patrols, and were designed to meet a compelling state interest.   Reasonableness was determined by balancing 
the intrusion against the public interest. The intrusion concerned both subjective and objective considerations. The 
objective analysis looked at the duration and the physical circumstance. The subjective determination focused on 
psychological factors. The main concern here is to avoid unbridled field discretion such as seen in roving patrols. 
Key factors were that supervisors made judgments based on guidelines, the area was safe and well-lighted, every one 
was stopped, and there was advanced publicity. The Illinois court anticipated the Sitz decision and the balancing test.
     People v. Pruitt (1996) is the only school metal detector case used in the CPS policy as support. The case 
involved students in the CPS and the 1992 policy discussed above. The court stated that the so-called policy 
“contains little in the way of standards for when and how the metal detector searches are to be conducted. It is 
virtually no policy at all (546).” CPS undertook a major revision after the Pruitt decision. Despite this policy failure, 
the court upheld the search and seizure of a gun from Pruitt based upon a random metal detector day at Fenger High 
School conducted by a swarm of forty uniformed Chicago Police officers (Pruitt, p. 544). 
                                                                                                                                             
   The court in Pruitt listed out principles for school searches which it said was instructed by three cases: New 
Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), Vernonia School District v. Acton (1995)
(allowed school to conduct random urinalysis for drugs of student-athletes citing special needs of public school 
context), and People v. Dilworth (1996) (approved search by school liaison officer of a flashlight based upon 
reasonable suspicion). The principles are:
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to searches by public school officials.
Society recognizes public school student’s subjective expectancy of privacy as legitimate. (See Illinois statute below 
regarding expectancy of privacy in public schools)
State cannot compel attendance at schools and then conduct unreasonable searches of legitimate non-contraband 
items they carry
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School officials cannot claim parent’s immunity to justify search.
A lower standard for school searches is justified to protect and maintain a proper educational environment.
Legality of a student search is determined by whether it is reasonable under all the circumstances.
The search must be reasonable in its inception and reasonably related in scope to the reason that justified search.
A search is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the search will turn up evidence 
that the student has violated or is violating the law or rules of the school.
A search’s scope is justified when measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives and not excessively 
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. The state’s power over 
schoolchildren permits a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults. 
 Special needs exist in the public school context that makes the probable cause and warrant requirements 
impracticable.
 The test to determine whether special needs exist requires a balance of competing interests of the individual and the 
state.  The factors are: the nature of the privacy interest, the character of the intrusion as minimal or significant, and 
the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern.
A liaison police officer is in the same position as a school official for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
By analogy to the other “administrative search” cases, individual suspicion is not required for a metal detector 
screening directed and controlled by school officials for the purpose of protecting and maintaining a proper 
educational environment for all students, not to investigate and secure evidence of a crime, and where all students 
walked through and no official discretion or opportunity to harass was                                                                          
           involved. The unanswered question of T.L.O. is answered: individual suspicion is 
           not an essential requirement for an “administrative search”.
     The court found that the screening was justified in its inception based upon the “reality of violence in the 
schools (p. 547).” It had rejected the specific act of violence proffered by the school as too remote, yet accepted 
“what everybody else knows: violence and the threat of violence are present in public schools (p. 546).” So much for 
Brandeis’ advocacy of the courts as standing against the majority roused by whatever momentary evil creates fear. 
     The CPS policy also bases its authority on a state statute that authorizes schools to search places and areas 
owned or controlled by the school in order to maintain order and security (105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-22.6(e), 2004). 
Officials are authorized to search personal effects left in such places without notice or consent of the student. The 
legislature declares as a matter of public policy that students have no reasonable expectation of privacy in such places 
and areas. Disciplinary action is authorized. Evidence may be turned over to the police. We are reminded of what a 
federal court said in Jones v. Latexo (1980), “But the mere announcement by officials that individual rights are about 
to be infringed upon cannot justify the subsequent infringement.”
     This section has shown the development of the law on which the CPS policy is based. Early cases exhibited 
the court’s concerns with the use of law enforcement officers in schools and with a need for some particular evidence 
of concern either for a particular school or a particular individual. Recent developments base suspicion-less searches 
on the violence or drug problem in schools generally. Schools have special needs outside of law enforcement to 
justify checkpoint type searches similar to automobile checkpoints. David Hume warned, “It is seldom that liberty of 
any kinds is lost all at once (Quotes about                                                                                                                       
Liberty).” Edmund Burke in a letter to the sheriffs of Bristol proclaimed, “The true danger is when liberty is nibbled 
away, for expedience, and by parts (Quotes about Liberty).”
Schooling as a Roadblock: Is attending school really like driving a car?
     The United States Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the use of metal detectors in public schools. Two 
of the four cases cited in the CPS policy concern automobile sobriety roadblocks. Metaphor is an important policy 
tool (Bardach, 2000, pp. 14,16). However, when our most fundamental rights are at stake, we must consider the 
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accuracy of the metaphor.
     Driving an automobile in Illinois is a privilege (People v. Turner, 1976). No one is forced to drive. Driving is 
reserved for those of significant age and ability (625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/6-103, 2004). Children between the age of 
seven and sixteen must attend school (105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/26-1, 2004). The state does not force people to drive or 
tell them where to drive. The state compels schooling in the district where the student resides unless the student is 
capable of paying for private schooling. The great number of children must attend the designated school. “Thus, there 
is a critical difference between one who, as a condition of a freely elected choice, consents to be searched, and one 
who is forced to be searched as a condition to something not freely chosen (Ferraraccio, 1999, p. 225). This 
argument also applies to the airport and courthouse metaphors. Adults can choose to travel many ways. No one is 
compelled to enter the courthouse except under some judicial order.
     The automobile roadblock cases involve a stop of the driver, a short conversation with a police officer, and 
production of a driver’s license. Courts have found that this is minimally intrusive. Courts have noted that metal 
detector searches are similarly                                                                                                                                          
minimally intrusive. The duration is short. Students must merely walk through the detector. Subjective intrusion is 
reduced by signs posted outside and guidelines and procedures that limit discretion in who gets searched. This focus 
on the method of search fails to examine the nature of the information revealed. True consideration of intrusiveness 
asks what the search reveals (Ferraraccio, 1999, p. 225). Wiretaps and electronic surveillance cause no intrusion if 
we simply examine the objective and subjective elements the courts use in roadblock cases. The person is not 
detained at all and since they do not know of the surveillance, have no fear. Yet such searches are protected under the 
Fourth Amendment (Katz v. U.S., 1957).  Metal detectors indiscriminately activate with any metal object. Once 
activated, CPS students are patted down. This pat down search may reveal contents far beyond the justification for 
the initial search for weapons. As the cases show, school officials and police are not likely to ignore non-weapon 
contraband turned up as a result of the search. Courts are not protecting the students since the search was within the 
scope of the original justification. Thus, a coin mistakenly left in a pocket or a metal button on clothing can cause a 
student to be patted down. A coin in the automobile driver’s pocket or a metal button on their clothing does not 
subject them to a pat down search.  
     The United States Supreme Court invalidated an automobile roadblock in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond 
(2000; hereafter Edmond). The roadblocks were established to stop the flow of illegal drugs. The court held that 
since this purpose is indistinguishable from a general interest in crime control, the searches were unreasonable and 
violated the fourth Amendment.  The Court did not allow the severe and intractable nature of the drug problem to 
determine whether individualized suspicion is necessary. The mere secondary                                                               
purpose of highway safety is a rouse that would allow all sorts of checkpoints without any limits. The Court is 
charged with looking at the primary purpose. The Court noted that exceptions to individualized suspicion have been 
approved only where there are special needs beyond law enforcement (p.37 citing Vernonia,1995) or in certain 
administrative situations where appropriate limits were in place ( p.37 citing Martinez-Fuerte 1976, Sitz 1990). 
     Edmond (2000) should cause concern for a CPS policy based upon automobile roadblock cases. The CPS 
policy’s purpose is to insure a proper educational environment. The policy authorizes school officials to seize any 
contraband revealed through searches (Chicago Public Schools Manual, section 409.3 Introduction). The Chicago 
Police Department must be called if a weapon is found (409.3 IV). Children are being charged with various crimes 
arising from the search by schools. Metal detectors search for weapons. If something sets the alarm off, a pat down 
may reveal a bulge. The bulge may be caused by many things including illegal drugs. Mere possession of drugs is 
hardly an immediate threat of violence against the school or students therein. While it may be appropriate for the 
school to discipline the student in light of the special control the school has over students and the non-adversarial 
relationship between educator and student, it does not follow that criminal charges should be supported from a search 
to find weapons which do pose a threat directly to the school and the students and were the direct reason for the 
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metal detector. A strong argument could be made that these metal detector screenings are nothing more than general 
law enforcement roadblocks. The courts have failed to recognize the difference between school sanctions and law 
enforcement actions in the                                                                                                                                            
school context or the difference between other contraband and weapons. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized the difference in Thompson v. Carthage (1996) when it ruled the exclusionary rule did not apply to 
expulsion hearing. Schools are special places charged with educating future citizens.
Special Needs
    Pruitt (1996) case is right in line with the trends of the Supreme Court. Pruitt relied on what everyone 
knows: schools are violent (546). Thus, the suspicion to justify search has moved from some students are bad to all 
students are bad; from individualized suspicion to general suspicion of youth. The United States Supreme Court has 
gone from reliance on some immediate school concerns and problems in Vernonia v. Acton(1995) to requiring no 
showing of a violence or weapon problem in Board of Education v.Earls (2002).  In essence, schools are special 
places and since drugs and violence are ravaging our nation, especially the public schools, the state has an interest 
that trumps the need of individuals. Of course, all of this is done to create a proper educational environment. 
     Our youth are seen as bad. “Children are being treated like criminals although they have committed no crime 
(Daviduke, 2001, p. 6).”  Metal detectors send the message to students that their schools and fellow students are 
dangerous (Ferraraccio, 1999, p.228). We must wonder whether students living in fear can learn (Daviduke, p. 5). 
The effective deputization of school staff leads to alienation between students and teachers (Daviduke, p.4).  
     All of our children have the special needs to be loved and respected. We must show them how to be good 
people and good citizens. We should show them that mass hysteria is                                                                            
no reason for vitiating important individual rights. People have been lead to believe that school violence is growing 
and rampant. This is contrary to the evidence. Metal detectors and other oppressive methods fall especially hard on 
the poor and students of color. We must ask, “What are we teaching or children?” 
The Policy: Conclusion
     The CPS policy on metal detectors was drafted in response to the Pruitt case.  The purpose of maintaining a 
proper educational environment by protecting students from violence is what the courts say justifies a lower standard 
than the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Schools have special needs beyond 
normal law enforcement to insure a safe learning environment. The CPS policy provides notice and has guidelines to 
restrict discretion of field officials so that students are not arbitrarily singled out. The search is justified in its 
inception because of the need to prevent weapons from entering the school and since schools are violent places, such 
a search will likely turn up weapons. The metal detector is designed to detect weapons and simply requires a walk-
through by the student. The state needs to immediately stop violence. Thus, the balance weighs in favor of the state. 
The CPS policy should pass legal muster despite possible concerns discussed above about the automobile analogy 
among others.
     However, just because we can do something doesn’t mean we should. Our schools are indeed special places. 
The may either incubate democracy or totalitarianism. Are we preparing future citizens with such a lowered 
expectancy of privacy that the government may simply do as they please?  We should remember the words of Justice 
Stevens, dissenting in TLO:                                                                                                                                                
           The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the 
           power of government. Through it passes every citizen and public official, from 
           schoolteachers to policemen and prison guards. The values they learn there, they 
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           take with them in life. One of the most cherished ideals is the one contained in 
           the Fourth Amendment: that government may not intrude on the personal privacy 
           of its citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstances (pp. 385-6). 
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